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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from 
an order the District Court entered on May 13, 2010, granting 
the motion of appellees United Health Group, AmeriChoice, and 
AmeriChoice-New Jersey (collectively “appellees”) under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Charles 
Wilkins‟ and Daryl Willis‟ (collectively “appellants”) qui tam 
action
1
 based on the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 
                                                 
1
 Private individuals can bring qui tam actions on behalf of the 
Government in exchange for their right to retain some portion of 
any resulting damages award.  See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. 
U.S. ex rel. Kirk, 131 S.Ct. 1885, 1889 (2011); Vt. Agency of 
  4 
3729, for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 
 Appellants have alleged that appellees, through their 
participation in federally funded health insurance programs, 
certified that they were in compliance with all healthcare laws 
and regulations even though they knowingly violated several 
Medicare marketing regulations, resulting in their submission of 
false claims for payment to the federal government.  Appellants 
further alleged that AmeriChoice-NJ violated the FCA by 
illegally providing kickbacks in violation of the Medicare Anti-
Kickback Statute (“AKS”), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b, to a New 
Jersey medical clinic to induce the clinic to switch its patients to 
AmeriChoice-NJ‟s Medicare and Medicaid programs.  
Moreover, appellants have alleged that AmeriChoice-NJ agents 
violated the AKS by enticing doctors to provide the names of 
patients eligible for Medicare and Medicaid programs.  Thus, 
this action involves two distinct types of claims with which we 
will deal separately.   
In addition to involving two distinct types of claims, the 
action implicates the two medical programs to which we already 
have referred, Medicare, a federally subsidized health insurance 
program for the elderly and certain disabled persons, see 42 
U.S.C. § 1395c and d, and Medicaid, a cooperative federal-state 
public assistance program pursuant to which the federal 
government makes matching funds available to pay for certain 
medical services furnished to needy individuals, see 42 U.S.C. § 
1396.  Some elderly poor are “dual eligible” under both 
                                                                                                             
Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769-70, 120 
S.Ct. 1858, 1860-61 (2000). 
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programs.
2
  Though appellants mention both programs in their 
complaint, this case is essentially a Medicare case arising, as the 
District Court indicated at the outset of its opinion, “out of 
alleged fraudulent claims to Medicare.”  United States ex rel. 
Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc., Civ. No. 08-3425, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47080, at *1 (D.N.J. May 13, 2010) 
(“Wilkins”).   
The District Court held that appellants‟ allegations failed 
to state a plausible claim for relief under the FCA for two 
reasons:  (1) appellants failed to identify a single false claim that 
appellees submitted to the Government, and (2) the marketing 
regulations that appellants claimed appellees violated were not 
relevant to the Government‟s decision to pay appellees‟ 
Medicare claims.  In addition, the Court dismissed appellants‟ 
AKS claims because they did not include an allegation that 
appellees certified that they were in compliance with the AKS or 
that such compliance was a relevant consideration when the 
Government processed their Medicare claims.  Inasmuch as we 
agree with the Court‟s disposition of appellants‟ Medicare 
marketing regulations claims but disagree with its holding with 
respect to appellants‟ AKS claims, we partially will affirm and 
                                                 
2
 Appellants state in their brief that dual eligible individuals 
receive their prescription drug coverage from Medicaid, but 
amicus curiae United States seems to describe Medicaid‟s 
responsibility more broadly with respect to dual eligible 
individuals.  We are not concerned, however, with the division 
between Medicare and Medicaid of responsibility for benefits 
for dual eligible individuals on this appeal and thus will not 
address that point. 
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partially will reverse the Court‟s May 13, 2010 order and we 
will remand the case to the District Court for further 
proceedings. 
 
II.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 In view of the procedural posture of this case, we set 
forth the facts as appellants have alleged them, and decide the 
appeal on the basis of those allegations and, in doing so, will 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to appellants. 
 See Lexington Nat. Ins. Corp. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 326 F.3d 416, 
417 (3d Cir. 2003).    
United Health provides access to health care services and 
resources and AmeriChoice and AmeriChoice-NJ are United 
Health subsidiaries offering Medicare Advantage (“MA”) 
plans.
3
  Under MA plans, AmeriChoice and AmeriChoice-NJ 
provide individuals enrolled in Medicare with health care 
                                                 
3
 Medicare Advantage, otherwise known as Medicare “Part C,” 
authorizes qualified individuals to opt out of traditional fee-for-
service coverage under Medicare Parts A and B and enroll in 
privately-run managed care plans that provide coverage for both 
inpatient and outpatient services.  42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-21, 
1395w-28.  United Health also offers qualified individuals 
coverage under Medicare Part D which is a voluntary 
prescription drug benefit program.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101 
et seq. 
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services and submit claims to the Government for 
reimbursement based on the number of patients enrolled in their 
Medicare programs.
4
  Organizations which provide services 
under Medicare do so pursuant to contracts with the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), a division of the 
Department of Health and Human Services charged with 
administering the Medicare and Medicaid programs.  See 42 
C.F.R. § 422.503(a).  Each month, as participants offering MA 
plans, appellees certify to CMS that they continue to comply 
with all of the CMS MA guidelines including MA marketing 
regulations and the AKS. 
 Wilkins and Willis began employment with United 
Health Group and AmeriChoice in 2007, Willis as a general 
manager for Medicare/Medicaid marketing and sales and 
Wilkins as a sales representative.  In April 2008, United Health 
terminated Wilkins‟ employment in reaction to his complaints 
concerning what he perceived were United Health‟s illegal 
practices which are the basis for this action.  Similarly, at some 
point during 2008, United Health, after demoting Willis for his 
conduct in making complaints to his supervisors about what he 
perceived were United Health‟s illegal practices, went further 
                                                 
4
 The Government pays MA plan participants a set amount of 
money based on the plans‟ enrollees‟ risk factors and other 
characteristics rather than paying them a fee for specific services 
performed.  See 42 C.F.R. §§ 422.300 et seq.  CMS makes 
advance monthly payments to participants calculated on the 
number of enrollees, adjusted to reflect risk and variations in 
rates within the plan‟s service area.  See 42 C.F.R. §§ 422.304, 
423.315.   
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and terminated his employment.   
On July 10, 2008, appellants filed this qui tam action 
under seal in the District Court alleging that appellees‟ sales 
representatives violated the FCA by offering physicians illegal 
kickbacks and violating MA marketing rules while accepting 
payments from government funded health insurance programs.  
Specifically, appellants alleged that: (1) United Health used 
marketing flyers that CMS did not approve beforehand; (2) its 
licensed sales agents engaged in marketing activities in the 
waiting rooms of clinics and doctors‟ offices; (3) non-licensed 
individuals engaged in marketing activities; (4) United Health 
commonly used an excessive number of sales representatives at 
presentations in an attempt to “overwhelm the public;” (5) sales 
representatives asked persons to raise their hands at 
presentations if they were eligible for both Medicare and 
Medicaid; (6) marketing personnel chased people in 
supermarkets to ask them whether they were dual eligible; (7) 
United Health used brokers to engage in door-to-door 
solicitation; (8) United Health sales agents gave out prizes at 
Medicare presentations in excess of $15 in value contrary to 
CMS guidelines; (9) AmeriChoice‟s sales representatives paid 
$27,000 to a medical clinic, Reliance Medical Group, to switch 
certain eligible beneficiaries to its Medicare and Medicaid plans; 
(10) United Health‟s sales representatives offered payments to 
physicians in exchange for the physicians providing appellees 
with the names of potential new enrollees eligible for Medicare 
and Medicaid; (11) United Health failed to maintain and 
  9 
implement a compliance program.
5
  App. at 39-46.       
After appellants filed this action the Government 
investigated their claims, and, during the investigation, in 
accordance with the FCA‟s requirements the case remained 
under seal.  On May 26, 2009, after the Government finished its 
investigation, it notified the parties that it would not intervene in 
the case.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B).
6
  On August 5, 2009, 
appellants filed an amended complaint which pleaded an FCA 
claim predicated on the allegations we discuss above and nine 
claims based on violations of state law.
7
  Notwithstanding the 
seeming specificity of appellants‟ complaint, they do not 
identify any specific claim for payment that United Health made 
                                                 
5
 Even though this last claim appears to be separate from 
appellants‟ claims based on marketing violations and illegal 
kickback payments, appellants do not make any separate 
arguments based on appellees‟ failure to maintain a compliance 
program. 
 
6
 The Government did not move to dismiss the action, as it could 
have done under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A). 
 
7
  The state law claims alleged that appellees‟ actions violated 
state false claims act provisions of New Jersey, Florida, Indiana, 
Michigan, Tennessee, Texas, and New York law.  In addition, 
Wilkins and Willis individually alleged that appellees violated 
the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 34:19-1 et seq. (West 2000).  These state law 
allegations are not at issue in this appeal.   
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to the federal Government in violation of the FCA.  The 
complaint, however, does allege that CMS makes advanced 
monthly payments to United Health for each enrollee in its plans 
and that United Health certifies each month its “continued 
compliance with all of the CMS [Medicare Advantage] 
Guidelines and based on such certification, United Defendants 
continues [sic] to receive the monthly capitation payment.”  Am. 
Compl. at 10.
8
   Thus appellants contend that appellees, by 
submitting claims for payment to CMS while failing to comply 
with the Medicare laws and regulations, including the AKS, 
presented false claims to the Government in violation of the 
FCA. 
 After the Government declined to intervene, appellees 
moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) for 
failure to plead fraud with particularity.
9
  The District Court 
granted appellees‟ motion for failure to state a claim and 
therefore did not address appellees‟ alternative argument for 
dismissal that appellants failed to plead their claims with the 
                                                 
8
 The parties have included the original complaint but not the 
amended complaint in their joint appendix.  We, however, have 
examined both versions of the complaint, and have considered 
both in our disposition of this appeal.  
 
9
 We have held that plaintiffs must plead FCA claims with 
particularity in accordance with Rule 9(b).  See U.S. ex rel. 
LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., 149 F.3d 227, 
234 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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particularity that Rule 9(b) requires.  The Court dismissed the 
complaint because appellants did not identify “even a single 
claim for payment to the Government.”  Wilkins, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 47080, at *13.  Moreover, the Court held that 
United Health‟s failure to comply with marketing guidelines and 
regulations that were not relevant to the Government‟s decision 
to issue payment could not be the basis for a recovery for an 
FCA violation.  The Court also rejected appellants‟ FCA claims 
that they based on violations of the AKS, finding that appellants 
failed to allege that United Health certified compliance with the 
AKS and also failed to allege that the Government predicated its 
funding decisions on such a certification.  Finally, the Court 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over appellants‟ 
state law claims and denied appellants‟ request for leave to 
amend the complaint.   
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the 
District Court‟s May 13, 2010 order, challenging the Court‟s 
decision granting appellees‟ motion to dismiss and arguing that, 
in any event, when the Court determined that it would dismiss 
the complaint it should have done so without prejudice and/or 
allowed appellants to amend their complaint.  The Government, 
though declining to intervene in the District Court and 
expressing no opinion on the merits of appellants‟ claims, has 
filed an amicus curiae brief urging us to reverse the District 
Court‟s order to the extent that the Court concluded that an FCA 
claim cannot survive if the plaintiff does not identify a specific 
false claim that a defendant submitted for payment and that 
appellants‟ kickback allegations did not state a claim for relief 
under the FCA.           
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III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over appellants‟ FCA 
claims under 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
supplemental jurisdiction over appellants‟ state law claims under 
28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have jurisdiction to review the District 
Court‟s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We exercise plenary review of the District Court‟s order 
granting appellees‟ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
 See Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 
367 (3d Cir. 2011).  As we have indicated, we accept all factual 
allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in 
the light most favorable to appellants, and determine whether, 
under any reasonable reading of the amended complaint, 
appellants may be entitled to relief.  Id.  In this determination 
“[t]he issue is not whether [appellants] will ultimately prevail 
but whether [they are] entitled to offer evidence to support the 
claims.”  See Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  We 
review the District Court‟s decisions to dismiss the complaint 
with prejudice and deny appellants‟ request for leave to amend 
their complaint for an abuse of discretion.  See In re NAHC, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002); Lake v. Arnold, 
232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000).      
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
A. The Record on Appeal 
  13 
 Before we discuss the merits of appellants‟ claims we 
address a dispute between the parties concerning whether  we 
should consider certain exhibits that appellants have included in 
the appendix.  Though ordinarily the parties on an appeal do not 
have a dispute over what documents should be in the record, in 
this case we address this question because appellants have 
included two documents in the joint appendix, without our 
leave, that neither party filed in the District Court and that the 
Court therefore did not consider, i.e., the February 13, 2008 
testimony of Kerry Weems, Acting Administrator for CMS, 
before the Senate Finance Committee on “Selling to Seniors: 
The Need for Accountability and Oversight of Marketing by 
Medicare Private Plans, Part 2” and a December 2009 report the 
United States Government Accountability Office authored on 
Medicare marketing.  See addendum to app. at 1-58.  Appellants 
contend that we should consider these materials as they are a 
matter of “public record” which “are inextricably intertwined 
and connected to items that are part of the record . . . .”  
Appellant‟s br. at 12-13. 
 Though we do not doubt the authenticity of these 
documents, nevertheless we will not consider them because the 
parties did not present them to the District Court and we do not 
find any indication in the record that the Court considered them 
on its own initiative.  See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a) (stating that 
record on appeal is composed of original papers and exhibits 
filed in district court, transcript of proceedings, if any, and a 
certified copy of docket entries prepared by district court clerk); 
Fed. R. App. P. 30 (limiting contents of a party‟s appendix to 
record before district court).  While we recognize that there 
might be “exceptional circumstances” which could justify our 
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consideration of these materials even though they were not 
presented to the District Court, we discern no such 
circumstances on the appeal.  See Acumed LLC v. Advanced 
Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 226 (3d Cir. 2009).   
We recognize that appellants argue that we should take 
judicial notice of the two documents as they are part of the 
“public record.”  Appellant‟s reply br. at 2.  Although a court of 
appeals may take judicial notice of a matter of public record not 
presented to the district court when reviewing the disposition of 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), see, e.g., Papasan v. 
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 n.1, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2935 n.1 (1986), 
we think that ordinarily a court of appeals should not take 
judicial notice of documents on an appeal which were available 
before the district court decided the case but nevertheless were 
not tendered to that court, the precise situation here.
10
  See Zell 
v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 542 F.2d 34, 38 (7th Cir. 1976) (refusing 
to take judicial notice of documents filed in companion case to 
undermine trial court‟s findings where to do so would violate 
rule that appellate court must consider only record before trial 
court).  Therefore, we will make our analysis by considering 
only the record that the parties made in the District Court for 
that Court‟s consideration of appellees‟ motion to dismiss.11   
                                                 
10
 Weems testified before appellants filed this action and the 
Accountability Office submitted the December 2009 report after 
appellants filed the action but before the District Court decided 
the case. 
 
11
 We add, however, that even if we expanded the record to 
  15 
B. The False Claims Act 
 1. FERA Amendments 
At this early point in our discussion we consider a recent 
amendment to the FCA.  On May 20, 2009, Congress enacted 
the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. 
L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009), which amended the FCA 
and re-designated 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) as 31 U.S.C. § 
3729(a)(1)(A) and 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) as 31 U.S.C. § 
3729(a)(1)(B).  The pre-FERA version of the FCA, imposed 
liability on: 
[A]ny person who— 
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, 
to an officer or employee of the United States 
Government or a member of the Armed Forces of 
the United States a false or fraudulent claim for 
payment or approval;  
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made 
or used, a false record or statement to get a false 
or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the 
Government. 
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(2). 
 
                                                                                                             
include the two documents our result on this appeal would not 
be different. 
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The FCA as FERA has amended it, now imposes liability 
on: 
[A]ny person who— 
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, 
a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 
approval; 
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made 
or used, a false record or statement material to a 
false or fraudulent claim[.] 
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). 
 The FCA defines “material” as “having a natural 
tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment 
or receipt of money or property.”  31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4).  For 
purposes of this case both versions of the FCA define a claim in 
pertinent part as a “request or demand . . . for money or property 
that . . . is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the 
United States . . . .”  31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (pre-FERA); 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(b)(2)(A)(i) (post-FERA).  FERA contains a retroactivity 
provision which applies only to section 3729(a)(1)(B), and 
provides that that clause “take[s] effect as if enacted on June 7, 
2008, and appl[ies] to all claims under [the FCA] that are 
pending on or after that date.”12  Pub. L. No. 111-21 § 4(f)(1), 
                                                 
12
 Congress adopted the term “material to,” as well as the 
retroactivity provision, in response to the Supreme Court‟s June 
9, 2008 decision in Allison Engine Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Sanders, 
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123 Stat. at 1625. 
Though appellants filed their complaint on July 10, 2008, 
and their amended complaint on August 5, 2009, they cited to 
the pre-FERA version of the FCA in both their original and 
amended complaints.  Nevertheless, appellants argued in the 
District Court that the addition of “material to” in section 
3729(a)(1)(B) made it easier to state a claim under the FCA 
inasmuch as, under the amended version of the FCA, a relator 
only need show that compliance with the applicable regulations 
which the defendant allegedly violated would have a tendency to 
influence the Government‟s payment decision.  The Court, 
though assuming that the amendment applied in this case, held 
that Congress‟ addition of a materiality requirement did not 
change the meaning of the FCA.  Appellants do not contend that 
the Court erred in this conclusion but they do argue that the 
                                                                                                             
553 U.S. 662, 128 S.Ct. 2123 (2008), which Congress viewed 
the Court as having decided incorrectly.  See S. Rep. No. 111-
10, at 11 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 437-39 
(“To correct the Allison Engine decision . . . in section 
3729(a)(2) the words „to get‟ were removed striking the 
language the Supreme Court found created an intent requirement 
for false claims liability under that section.  In place of this 
language, the Committee inserted the words „material to‟ a false 
or fraudulent claim.”).  In Allison Engine, the Supreme Court 
held that a plaintiff “must prove that the defendant intended that 
the false record or statement be material to the Government‟s 
decision to pay or approve the false claim.”  553 U.S. at 665, 
128 S.Ct. at 2126. 
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original complaint “clearly alleged a time period were [sic] 
claims would be pending on June 7, 2008.”  Appellants‟ br. at 
16 n.17.  Appellees argue that the majority of courts considering 
the applicability of the retroactivity provision have determined 
that the retroactivity provision does not apply to cases which 
were pending on June 7, 2008.
13
  Appellees‟ br. at 9 n.6 (citing 
Hopper v. Solvay Pharm., Inc, 588 F.3d 1318, 1327 n.3 (11th 
Cir. 2009)).
14
   
 We need not decide whether the earlier or amended 
version of the FCA is applicable because we conclude that 
appellants‟ claims based on appellees‟ alleged violation of the 
Medicare marketing regulations cannot survive appellees‟ 
motion to dismiss under either version of the statute.   Moreover, 
as we explain later, appellants‟ claims under the AKS fall only 
under pre-FERA section 3729(a)(1), which was still in force at 
the time that appellees submitted their claims for payment to the 
Government and at the time that appellants filed this suit.  
Therefore, we will decide this case under the pre-FERA version 
of section 3729(a)(1).      
                                                 
13
 This is a puzzling argument inasmuch as this case was not 
pending on June 7, 2008. 
 
14
 At least one district court has held that FERA‟s retroactivity 
provision violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution.  See U.S. ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 
667 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756 (S.D. Ohio 2009).  Clearly, we need 
not consider that possibility. 
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2. Establishing a Claim Under the FCA 
The primary purpose of the FCA “is to indemnify the 
government-through its restitutionary penalty provisions-against 
losses caused by a defendant‟s fraud.”  Mikes v. Straus, 274 
F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing U.S. ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 
317 U.S. 537, 549, 551-52, 63 S.Ct. 379, 388 (1943)).  A 
plaintiff, in order to establish a prima facie FCA violation under 
section 3729(a)(1), must prove that “(1) the defendant presented 
or caused to be presented to an agent of the United States a 
claim for payment; (2) the claim was false or fraudulent; and (3) 
the defendant knew the claim was false or fraudulent.”  U.S. ex 
rel. Schmidt v. Zimmer, Inc., 386 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Hutchins v. Wilentz, 
Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2001).  As we 
have indicated, a private individual, otherwise known as a 
relator, may bring a civil action in the name of the United States 
to enforce this provision of the FCA and may share a percentage 
of any recovery resulting from the suit.  31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) & 
(d). 
 There are two categories of false claims under the FCA: a 
factually false claim and a legally false claim.  U.S. ex rel. 
Conner v. Salina Reg‟l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1217 
(10th Cir. 2008).  A claim is factually false when the claimant 
misrepresents what goods or services that it provided to the 
Government and a claim is legally false when the claimant 
knowingly falsely certifies that it has complied with a statute or 
regulation the compliance with which is a condition for 
Government payment.  Id.  A legally false FCA claim is based 
on a “false certification” theory of liability.  See Rodriguez v. 
  20 
Our Lady of Lourdes Med. Ctr., 552 F.3d 297, 303 (3d Cir. 
2008), overruled in part on other grounds by U.S. ex rel. 
Eisenstein v.  City of New York, 129 S.Ct. 2230 (2009).  On this 
appeal, we are concerned only with allegedly legally false claims 
related to appellees‟ eligibility to receive payment, as appellants 
do not contend that appellees did not deliver the services for 
which they sought payment.   
There is a further division of categories of claims as the 
courts have recognized that there are two types of false 
certifications, express and implied.  See, e.g., Conner, 543 F.3d 
at 1217.  Under the “express false certification” theory, an entity 
is liable under the FCA for falsely certifying that it is in 
compliance with regulations which are prerequisites to 
Government payment in connection with the claim for payment 
of federal funds.  Rodriguez, 552 F.3d at 303.  There is a more 
expansive version of the express false certification theory called 
“implied false certification” liability which attaches when a 
claimant seeks and makes a claim for payment from the 
Government without disclosing that it violated regulations that 
affected its eligibility for payment.  Id.  Thus, an implied false 
certification theory of liability is premised “on the notion that 
the act of submitting a claim for reimbursement itself implies 
compliance with governing federal rules that are a precondition 
to payment.”  Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699; see also United States v. 
Sci. Applications Int‟l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (“Courts infer implied certifications from silence where 
certification was a prerequisite to the government action 
sought.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
The United States Court of Federal Claims seems to have 
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been the first court to recognize that there can be implied false 
certification liability under the FCA.  See Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. 
v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429 (Fed. Cl. 1994), aff‟d, 57 F.3d 
1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  In Ab-Tech the court held that Ab-
Tech‟s submission of payment vouchers to the Government 
impliedly certified that Ab-Tech was continuing to adhere to the 
eligibility requirements of a federal small business program in 
which it was a participant.  Id. at 433-34.  Though the vouchers 
did not contain any express misrepresentations, Ab-Tech‟s 
failure to honor the requirements of the program rendered it 
subject to false certification liability under the FCA.  Id. at 434. 
    While we have held that there can be express false 
certification liability under the FCA, see U.S. ex rel. Kosenske 
v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2009), we have 
not decided whether there can be implied false certification 
liability under the FCA.  See Rodriguez, 552 F.3d at 303-04.
15
  
However, other courts of appeals have considered this 
possibility and a majority of those courts, including those in the 
Second, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia 
Circuits have recognized that there can be implied false 
certification liability under the FCA.  See Mikes, 274 F.3d at 
699-700; U.S. ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Servs., Inc., 
289 F.3d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 2002); Ebeid ex rel. U.S. v. 
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  In Rodriguez we stated that we have “yet to adopt in a 
holding the false certification theory, either in its express or 
implied version.” 552 F.3d at 303-04.  But, as we have 
indicated, we later recognized that there can be FCA liability 
under an express false certification theory and therefore our 
statement in Rodriguez is no longer true. 
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Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 996-98 (9th Cir. 2010); Conner, 543 
F.3d at 1217-18; McNutt ex rel. U.S. v. Haleyville Med. 
Supplies, Inc., 423 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005); Sci. 
Applications Int‟l Corp., 626 F.3d at 1266, 1269; but see U.S. ex 
rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med. Inc., ____ F.3d ____, 2011 
WL 2150191, at *7 (1st Cir. June 1, 2011) (declining to employ 
judicially created categories of express and implied false 
certification); Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 
176 F.3d 776, 786 n.8 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating without 
addressing validity of implied false certification theory under 
FCA, that its precedent makes the theory “questionable”).  We 
now join with these many courts of appeals in holding that a 
plaintiff may bring an FCA suit under an implied false 
certification theory of liability. 
We adopt the implied false certification theory for 
liability for several reasons.  First, the implied false certification 
theory gives effect to Congress‟ expressly stated purpose that 
the FCA should “reach all fraudulent attempts to cause the 
Government to pay [out] sums of money or to deliver property 
or services.”  S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5274; see also United States v. Neifert-
White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232, 88 S.Ct. 959, 961 (1968) (“[T]he 
[FCA] was intended to reach all types of fraud, without 
qualification, that might result in financial loss to the 
government.”).  Moreover, our ruling is consistent with 
Congress‟ stated intent inasmuch as under the implied false 
certification theory of liability, even in the absence of a false 
certification of compliance, the Government or qui tam 
plaintiffs successfully may bring an action that holds a claimant 
liable for submitting legally false claims to the Government:  
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[A] false claim may take many forms, the most 
common being a claim for goods or services not 
provided, or provided in violation of contract 
terms, specification, statute, or regulation . . . .  
[Claims made to Medicare or Medicaid programs] 
may be false even though the services are 
provided as claimed if, for example, the claimant 
is ineligible to participate in the program. . . .   
S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 9, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5266, 5274.   
In addition, the language and the structure of the FCA 
support the conclusion that a claim based on an implied false 
certification “may constitute [an actionable] false or fraudulent 
claim.”  Shaw v. AAA Eng‟g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 
531 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Under 
§ 3729(a)(2), liability is premised on the presentation of a „false 
record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or 
approved.‟”  Id.  On the other hand, section 3729(a)(1) requires 
only that a claimant present “a „false or fraudulent claim for 
payment or approval‟ without the additional element of a „false 
record or statement.‟”  Id.  Therefore, section 3729(a)(1), when 
compared with section 3729(a)(2), indicates that a plaintiff can 
bring a claim under the FCA even without evidence that a 
claimant for Government funds made an express false statement 
in order to obtain those funds.  Id.           
 As several courts of appeals have held, however, the 
implied certification theory of liability should not be applied 
expansively, particularly when advanced on the basis of FCA 
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allegations arising from the Government‟s payment of claims 
under federally funded health care programs.  In particular, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Mikes recognized 
that the rationale behind Ab-Tech “does not fit comfortably into 
the health care context because the [FCA] was not designed for 
use as a blunt instrument to enforce compliance with all medical 
regulations - but rather only those regulations that are a 
precondition to payment . . . .”  Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699.  
Moreover, in Rodriguez, although we did not expressly adopt 
the implied false certification theory, we stated that “[t]o state a 
claim under [the implied false certification] theory it is 
necessary to allege not only a receipt of federal funds and a 
failure to comply with applicable regulations, but also that 
payment of the federal funds was in some way conditioned on 
compliance with those regulations.”  552 F.3d at 304.  Thus, 
under this theory a plaintiff must show that if the Government 
had been aware of the defendant‟s violations of the Medicare 
laws and regulations that are the bases of a plaintiff‟s FCA 
claims, it would not have paid the defendant‟s claims.  See 
Conner, 543 F.3d at 1219-20 (“If the government would have 
paid the claims despite knowing that the contractor has failed to 
comply with certain regulations, then there is no false claim for 
purposes of the FCA.”).  Absent this requirement, the FCA 
could turn “into „a blunt instrument to enforce compliance with 
all . . . regulations‟ rather than „only those regulations that are a 
precondition to payment.‟”  Rodriguez, 552 F.3d at 304 (quoting 
Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699).  With these principles in mind, we now 
will consider appellants‟ FCA allegations. 
 3. Violations of Medicare Marketing Regulations 
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 As we already have indicated, appellants contend that 
United Health personnel engaged in marketing practices which 
violated several Medicare marketing regulations, including: (1) 
using marketing flyers and forms that CMS did not approve; (2) 
engaging in marketing activities in the waiting rooms of clinics 
and doctors‟ offices; (3) allowing non-licensed individuals to 
engage in marketing activities; (4) using an excessive number of 
sales representatives at presentations in an attempt to 
“overwhelm the public;” (5) asking persons to raise their hands 
at Medicare presentations if they were dual eligible for Medicare 
and Medicaid; (6) chasing people in supermarkets to ask 
whether they were dual eligible; (7) using agents to engage in 
door-to-door solicitation; and (8) giving out prizes at Medicare 
presentations in excess of $15 in value. 
The District Court held that appellants‟ allegations that 
United Health engaged in illegal marketing did not state a claim 
for relief under either an express or implied false certification 
theory.  According to the Court, these allegations did not state a 
claim under an express false certification theory inasmuch as 
appellants failed to plead a single instance of United Health 
submitting a false claim for payment to the Government: 
“Without an allegation of a claim, Relators‟ False Claims Act 
claim is like a battery without a touching, or a defamation 
without a statement.”  Wilkins, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47080, at 
*14.  In support of its holding, the Court cited to our opinion in 
Rodriguez, but appellants and amicus curiae contend that the 
District Court mischaracterized the holding of Rodriguez, and 
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we agree.
16
 
 In Rodriguez, we based our holding affirming the district 
court‟s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the relators‟ FCA action on 
their failure adequately to plead, under an implied false 
certification theory, that the defendant violated a law or 
regulation connected to the Government‟s decision to pay the 
defendant‟s claims rather than on the relators‟ failure to identify 
a specific claim for payment that the defendant submitted to the 
Government.  552 F.3d at 304.  It is true that to recover under 
the FCA, we have recognized that ultimately a plaintiff must 
come forward with at least a “single false [or fraudulent] claim” 
that the defendants submitted to the Government for payment.  
U.S. ex rel. Quinn v. Omnicare Inc., 382 F.3d 432, 440 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Thus, in Quinn we held that the district court correctly 
granted the defendant‟s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) 
motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff‟s failure to 
identify a single claim for payment to the Government arising 
from defendant‟s alleged Medicare fraud.  Id.  But to our 
knowledge we never have held that a plaintiff must identify a 
specific claim for payment at the pleading stage of the case to 
state a claim for relief.  See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 
F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (“It is axiomatic that the standards 
for dismissing claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 
granting judgment under . . . Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 are vastly 
different.”).  
                                                 
16
 The District Court also cited one of our not precedential 
opinions but we will not discuss that case.  See 3d Cir. Internal 
Operating P. 5.7 (“The court by tradition does not cite to its not 
precedential opinions as authority.”). 
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In any event, as appellants correctly point out, the 
question of whether a plaintiff, at the pleading stage, must 
identify representative examples of specific false claims that a 
defendant made to the Government in order to plead an FCA 
claim properly is a requirement under the more particular 
pleading standards of Rule 9(b).  See Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 998-99 
(listing cases and noting disagreement among courts of appeals). 
 But here, as we stated above, the District Court explicitly 
declined to analyze appellants‟ claims under the pleading 
requirements of Rule 9(b).   
Nevertheless, we see no need to decide whether 
appellants‟ marketing claims satisfied the pleading requirements 
of Rule 9(b), because, despite our rejection of the District 
Court‟s reasoning with respect to appellants‟ claim under an 
express false certification theory, we will affirm its holding 
dismissing appellants‟ claims predicated on the Medicare 
marketing regulations on the same ground that the Court 
provided for denying appellants‟ claims under an implied false 
certification theory.  Thus, we will affirm the District Court‟s 
order rejecting appellants‟ claims predicated on the violation of 
Medicare marketing regulations because appellants‟ allegations 
that appellees violated the regulations do not state a plausible 
claim for relief under the FCA inasmuch as the Government‟s 
payments of appellees‟ Medicare claims were not conditioned 
on their compliance with the marketing regulations. 
As we stated above, to plead a claim upon which relief 
could be granted under a false certification theory, either express 
or implied, a plaintiff must show that compliance with the 
regulation which the defendant allegedly violated was a 
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condition of payment from the Government.  Rodriguez, 552 
F.3d at 304; Mikes, 274 F.3d at 698.  In determining whether 
compliance with a regulation was a condition of payment from 
the Government, courts have distinguished between regulations 
which are conditions of participation in the Medicare programs 
and conditions of Government payment of Medicare funds.  
Conner, 543 F.3d at 1220; Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697 (“Since the 
Act is restitutionary and aimed at retrieving ill-begotten funds, it 
would be anomalous to find liability when the alleged 
noncompliance would not have influenced the government‟s 
decision to pay.”).  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
explained the difference between conditions of participation and 
conditions of payment: “Conditions of participation . . . are 
enforced through administrative mechanisms, and the ultimate 
sanction for violation of such conditions is removal from the 
government program,” while “[c]onditions of payment are those 
which, if the government knew they were not being followed, 
might cause it to actually refuse payment.”  Conner, 543 F.3d at 
1220.    
Appellants assert that 42 C.F.R. § 423.509, pursuant to 
which CMS may terminate a contract with a Medicare sponsor 
that fails to comply with the applicable marketing guidelines, 
demonstrates “[t]he relevancy and materiality of compliance” 
with the marketing guidelines.  Appellants‟ br. at 23.  Indeed, 
section 423.509 states that “CMS may at any time terminate a 
contract if CMS determines that the Part D plan sponsor  . . . 
[s]ubstantially fails to comply with . . . [m]arketing requirements 
in subpart V of this part.” 42 C.F.R. § 423.509(a)(8)(i); 42 
C.F.R. § 422.510(a)(11) (same for MA organization).  The same 
regulation, however, provides that before CMS may issue a 
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notice of intent to terminate a Medicare contract it will provide a 
plan sponsor “a reasonable opportunity of at least 30 calendar 
days to develop and implement a corrective action plan to 
correct the deficiencies.”  42 C.F.R. § 423.509(c)(1)(i); 42 
C.F.R. § 422.510(c)(1)(i).  The regulation further provides, in 
section (c)(2)(iii), an exception for the 30-day correction period 
if the termination is based on “credible evidence, [that the Plan 
Sponsor] has committed or participated in false, fraudulent, or 
abusive activities affecting the Medicare, Medicaid, or other 
State or Federal health care programs, including submission of 
false or fraudulent data.” 42 C.F.R. § 423.509(a)(4); 42 C.F.R. § 
422.510(c)(2)(iii) (referring to 42 C.F.R. § 422.510(a)(4)).  The 
regulation also contains an exception to the requirement that a 
sponsor be allowed a 30-day correction period where CMS‟s 
delay in termination, or the financial difficulties of the Plan 
Sponsor, pose an imminent and serious risk to the health of the 
individuals enrolled in the sponsor‟s plan.  42 C.F.R. § 
423.509(c)(2)(i)-(ii); 42 C.F.R. § 422.510(c)(2)(i)-(ii).  Thus, 
sections 423.509 and 422.510 clearly demonstrate that 
compliance with the marketing regulations is a condition of 
participation and not a condition of payment as the regulations 
draw a line between the type of violations which are correctible 
and, if corrected, will allow the sponsor to continue as a 
Medicare program participant and the type of violations which 
lead to immediate termination of a CMS contract.   
Accordingly, the fundamental flaw in appellants‟ 
allegations is that the amended complaint does not cite to any 
regulation demonstrating that a participant‟s compliance with 
Medicare marketing regulations is a condition for its receipt of 
payment from the Government.  Nor do appellants cite 
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examples, in case law or otherwise, of the Government seeking 
recovery of Medicare payments for services that a provider 
actually performed on the basis that its lack of compliance with 
marketing regulations rendered those services fraudulent.  
Appellants offer no evidence beyond a CMS published 
statement that the guidelines “were developed after careful 
consideration by CMS of current industry practices, recent 
advancements in communication technology, and how best to 
protect the interests of Medicare beneficiaries.”  Appellant‟s br. 
at 21; app. at 210.  This statement, however, does not indicate 
that a participant‟s compliance with marketing regulations is a 
condition for Government payment under the federal health care 
programs.  Moreover, we think that it is appropriate for us to 
presume that the CMS surely develops all of its regulations after 
careful consideration of these and other relevant factors no 
matter what it determines should be the consequences of a 
participant‟s non-compliance with the regulations.17 
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 Similarly, appellants contend that Weems‟ statement, which 
we have determined is not part of the record on which we will 
decide this appeal, that “protecting people with Medicare from 
deceptive or harmful practices is among our highest priorities at 
CMS,” demonstrates the relevancy of the marketing guidelines 
to the Government‟s decision to pay Medicare claims.  
Appellant‟s br. at 21.  However, even if we included that 
statement in the materials that we consider in deciding this 
appeal, we would regard the statement as demonstrating only 
that CMS considers the marketing regulations to be very 
important, but we would not regard the statement as indicating 
what the consequence of non-compliance should be.  After all, 
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Further, considering that the Government has established 
an administrative mechanism for managing and correcting 
Medicare marketing violations which includes remedies for 
violations other than the withholding of payment otherwise due, 
it is clear that, although the Government considers substantial 
compliance with the marketing regulations “a condition of 
ongoing Medicare participation, it does not require perfect 
compliance as an absolute condition for receiving Medicare 
payments for services rendered.”  Conner, 543 F.3d at 1221.  
Furthermore, we think that anyone examining Medicare 
regulations would conclude that they are so complicated that the 
best intentioned plan participant could make errors in attempting 
to comply with them.  Moreover, it is ironical that if we allowed 
appellants, though they are ostensibly acting on behalf of the 
Government, to bring suit based on United Health‟s non-
compliance with marketing regulations, we would short-circuit 
the very remedial process the Government has established to 
address non-compliance with those regulations.  “It would . . . 
be curious to read the FCA, a statute intended to protect the 
government‟s fiscal interests, to undermine the government‟s 
own regulatory procedures.”  Id. at 1222.   
Finally, like the District Court in this case and the courts 
of appeals in Conner and Mikes, we question the wisdom of 
regarding every violation of a Medicare regulation as a basis for 
a qui tam suit.  Conner, 543 F.3d at 1221; Mikes, 274 F.3d at 
                                                                                                             
as appellees aptly point out, “[p]resumably all regulations and 
agency guidelines have some importance to the government 
agency, or there would be no purpose for the agency to 
promulgate them.”  Appellees‟ br. at 24.   
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699-700.  Federal agencies are unquestionably better suited than 
federal courts to ensure compliance with Medicare marketing 
regulations.  In the circumstances, we believe that by permitting 
qui tam plaintiffs to file suit based on the violation of 
regulations which may be corrected through an administrative 
process and which are not related directly to the Government‟s 
payment of a claim, courts unwisely would shift the burden of 
enforcing the Medicare regulations to themselves even though 
the administration of the vast and complicated Medicare 
program is best left to the administrators.
18
  In this regard, we 
point out that if we adopted appellants‟ broad theory of FCA 
liability, every time a plan participant‟s agent gave out a prize 
worth over $15.00, or asked Medicare participants eligible for 
Medicaid to raise their hands at a meeting, assuming that these 
are improper marketing techniques, the agent‟s conduct could be 
the basis for a federal court action.  We do not think that this is 
the purpose of 42 C.F.R. § 423.509, 42 C.F.R. § 422.510, the 
marketing regulations, or the FCA.   
 In sum, inasmuch as compliance with the Medicare 
marketing regulations is not a condition for Government 
payment under the federal health insurance programs, the 
District Court properly dismissed appellants‟ FCA claims based 
on appellees‟ violations of those regulations for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.  
 4. The Anti-Kickback Statute 
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 In reaching this conclusion we point out that administrators 
sometimes address and resolve problems informally using 
procedures that courts would not employ. 
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 The AKS, in relevant part, provides that  
(2) whoever knowingly and willfully offers or 
pays any remuneration (including any kickback, 
bribe or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or 
covertly, in cash or in kind to any person to 
induce such person— 
(A) to refer an individual to a person for 
the furnishing or arranging for the 
furnishing of any time or service for which 
payment may be made in whole or in part 
under a Federal health care program, or 
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange 
for or recommend purchasing, leasing, or 
ordering any good, facility, service, or item 
for which payment may be made in whole 
or in part under a Federal health care 
program, 
shall be guilty of a felony upon conviction 
thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 or 
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. 
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2).
19
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 As part of the comprehensive health care legislation Congress 
enacted in 2010, it amended the AKS to clarify that “a claim that 
includes items or services resulting from a violation of this 
section constitutes a false or fraudulent claim for purposes of 
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As we stated above, a prima facie claim under the FCA 
requires that the plaintiff show that “(1) the defendant presented 
or caused to be presented to an agent of the United States a 
claim for payment; (2) the claim was false or fraudulent; and (3) 
the defendant knew the claim was false or fraudulent.”  Schmidt, 
386 F.3d at 242.  We have held that “[f]alsely certifying 
compliance with the . . . Anti-Kickback Act[] in connection with 
a claim submitted to a federally funded insurance program is 
actionable under the FCA.”  Kosenske, 554 F.3d at 94.  Further, 
in Schmidt we stated that “[a] certificate of compliance with 
federal health care law is a prerequisite to eligibility under the 
Medicare program.”  386 F.3d at 243 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 
413.24(f)(4)(iv)).   
                                                                                                             
[the FCA].”  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
(“PPACA”), Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 6402(f), 124 Stat. 119, 759 
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g)).  But the PPACA 
was not in effect at the time of the alleged violations at issue in 
this case or at the time that appellants filed this action, and there 
is no indication that Congress intended for the PPACA to apply 
retroactively.  See Graham County Soil & Water Conservation 
Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 130 S.Ct. 1396, 1400 n.1 (2010) 
(“The [PPACA] makes no mention of retroactivity, which would 
be necessary for its application to pending cases given that it 
eliminates petitioners‟ claimed defense to a qui tam suit.”).  
Therefore we will not consider this amendment in our analysis 
of appellants‟ AKS claims.  In the circumstances, though we are 
aware that there is an ongoing nationwide dispute with respect 
to the constitutionality of the PPACA, we are not joining in that 
controversy, at least not at this time. 
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In dismissing appellants‟ AKS allegations, the District 
Court stated that “[r]elators never once alleged that United 
Health certified compliance with the [AKS], nor did they allege 
that such compliance was relevant to the Government‟s funding 
decisions (if indeed any were made, which Relators failed to 
allege).”  Wilkins, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47080, at *18.  
Appellants argue that “[a] certificate of compliance with federal 
health care law is a prerequisite to eligibility under the Medicare 
Program,” see appellant‟s br. at 41 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 
413.24(f)(4)(iv)), and argue that they specifically referenced that 
certificate of compliance in the amended complaint by referring 
to the Medicare Managed Care Manual which states that a plan 
sponsor ensures compliance with applicable federal laws, 
including, specifically, the FCA and the AKS.   
The Government, as amicus curiae, supports appellants‟ 
position by pointing out that Medicare regulations require MA 
and Prescription Drug Plan (“PDP”) organizations to operate 
under agreements with CMS which include a provision 
requiring that the organization comply with the AKS.  See 42 
C.F.R. §§ 422.504(h) (“The MA organization agrees to comply 
with—(1) Federal laws and regulations designed to prevent or 
ameliorate fraud, waste, and abuse, including… [the AKS]”).  
United Health responds that the District Court‟s holding was 
correct inasmuch as “[n]owhere within the four corners of 
Relators‟ Amended Complaint did the Relators allege the nexus 
between compliance with the AKS and payment to a Medicare 
Advantage plan contractor. . . .”  Appellees‟ br. at 34. 
The issue of whether appellants properly pleaded an FCA 
claim based on United Health‟s express false certification of 
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compliance with the AKS presents a close question.  Yet we 
cannot ignore appellants‟ pleading in their amended complaint 
that “[e]ach month . . . United Defendants certify to CMS its 
continued compliance with all of the CMS MA Guidelines and 
based on such certification, United Defendants continues [sic] to 
receive the monthly capitation payments.”  App. at 31.  
Moreover, in the next section of the amended complaint, 
appellants summarized the applicable Medicare regulations and 
pleaded that an MA Organization may not provide “[a]ny 
incentive that might have the effect of inducing enrollees to use 
a particular provider, practitioner or supplier cannot [sic] violate 
1128A(a)5 [sic] of the Social Security Act and the 
corresponding regulations related to the federal anti-kickback 
statute.”  Id. at 32.   Further, appellants alleged that 
AmeriChoice paid $27,000 to the Reliance Medical Group to 
induce the owners of the clinic to change dual eligible 
beneficiaries from Horizon Blue and move them to 
AmeriChoice, and that AmeriChoice agents enticed doctors into 
receiving additional income if they provided agents with names 
of the physicians‟ patients.  Arguably, these allegations state a 
claim for relief under an express false certification theory 
inasmuch as appellants allege that appellees falsely certified 
compliance with the AKS in order to receive monthly payments 
from the Government. 
But we need not decide whether the amended complaint 
states a claim under an express false certification theory because 
appellants‟ allegations in the amended complaint clearly state a 
claim for relief under an implied false certification theory of 
liability.  Under an implied false certification theory, instead of 
looking at the defendant‟s representations to the Government, 
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“the analysis focuses on the underlying contracts, statutes, or 
regulations themselves to ascertain whether they make 
compliance a prerequisite to the government‟s payment.”  
Conner, 543 F.3d at 1218.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
District Court‟s holding that because appellants failed to allege 
in their complaint that United Health certified its compliance 
with the AKS their AKS claim must fail is incorrect when we 
analyze the amended complaint under an implied false 
certification theory of liability.  To plead a claim for relief under 
an implied certification theory, appellants were required to 
allege, as they did, that appellees submitted claims for payment 
to the Government at a time that they knowingly violated a law, 
rule, or regulation which was a condition for receiving payment 
from the Government.   
We reach our conclusion because appellants‟ amended 
complaint meets the implied false certification standards for 
liability as they alleged that appellees received payment from the 
federal health insurance programs despite their knowing 
violation of the AKS.  Moreover, unlike the plaintiffs in 
Rodriguez, 552 F.3d at 304, appellants alleged that compliance 
with the AKS was an express condition of payment to which 
appellees agreed when they entered into an agreement with 
CMS.  See app. at 31-32; 37-38 (stating that “Compliance with 
CMS MA Guidelines . . . are express conditions of payment” 
and stating that the AKS is part of the MA Guidelines).  We 
conclude that appellants, in stating a plausible claim for relief at 
this stage of the proceedings for their complaint to survive a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, need not allege a relationship between the 
alleged AKS violations and the claims appellees submitted to 
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the Government.
20
  Rather, the complaint is sufficient to survive 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because appellants have 
pleaded that appellees knowingly violated the AKS while 
submitting claims for payment to the Government under the 
federal health insurance program.  See Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 998 
(“Implied false certification occurs when an entity has 
previously undertaken to expressly comply with a law, rule, or 
regulation, and that obligation is implicated by submitting a 
claim for payment even though a certification of compliance is 
not required in the process of submitting the claim.”).             
   We disagree with the District Court to the extent that it 
held that compliance with the AKS was not a condition for 
payment from the Government under the federal health 
insurance program.  Compliance with the AKS is clearly a 
condition of payment under Parts C and D of Medicare and 
appellees do not refer us to any judicial precedent holding 
otherwise.  In fact, the precedents hold the opposite.  See, e.g., 
Kosenske, 554 F.3d at 94 (“Falsely certifying compliance with 
the Stark or Anti-Kickback Acts in connection with a claim 
submitted to a federally funded insurance program is actionable 
under the FCA.”); McNutt, 423 F.3d at 1259-60; Conner, 543 
F.3d at 1223 n.8 (listing cases).  Indeed, as both amicus curiae 
and appellants point out, Medicare regulations specifically name 
the AKS as a statute that is “designed to prevent or ameliorate 
fraud, waste, and abuse.”  42 C.F.R. §§ 422.504(h), 423.505(h). 
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 We emphasize again that we are not reviewing these claims 
under the particularized pleading standards of Rule 9(b). 
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We have not overlooked appellees‟ argument that our 
holding will transform the FCA into a strict liability statute in 
which “every participant in the Medicare program impliedly 
certifies each time it submits a claim for payment to the program 
that the claim does not arise from some payment arrangement 
that—however attenuated, immaterial, and unknowing—could 
be characterized as a violation of the AKS.”  Appellees‟ br. at 
36.  Rather, we consider but reject this argument.  First, the 
AKS does not prohibit all payment arrangements related to 
federal health care programs as the statute contains several safe 
harbor provisions allowing such arrangements.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
1320a-7b(b)(3)(A)-(F).  Further, contrary to appellees‟ 
argument, a defendant could not be held accountable for an 
“unknowing” illegal payment arrangement inasmuch as the AKS 
explicitly requires that for any payment to induce a person to 
refer an individual for the furnishing of healthcare services to be 
unlawful it must be made knowingly and willfully.     
In order to avoid FCA liability under an implied 
certification theory, participants making claims to the 
Government under the federal health care programs have to 
ensure that they are not violating the federal health care laws 
which they agreed to follow when they entered into contracts 
with CMS.  As we made clear above, for purposes of the FCA,  
this compliance does not require perfect adherence to 
regulations which are not prerequisites to payment from the 
Government.  Compliance, however, does require a participant 
in a federal health care program to refrain from offering or 
entering into payment arrangements which violate the AKS, 
while making claims for payment to the Government under that 
program.  We do not think this is an unreasonable requirement 
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to impose on federal health care contractors, for as Justice 
Holmes once wrote: “Men must turn square corners when they 
deal with the Government.”  Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. 
United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143, 41 S.Ct. 55, 56 (1920).  And 
as the United States as amicus curiae points out, “[t]he 
Government does not get what it bargained for when a 
defendant is paid by CMS for services tainted by a kickback.”  
Amicus curiae br. at 31.  Therefore, we hold that appellants, by 
alleging that appellees violated the AKS while submitting 
claims for payment to a federal health insurance program, have 
stated a plausible claim for relief under the FCA.   
C. Amendment of the Complaint 
  Appellants argue that the District Court erred by 
dismissing the case with prejudice.  In this regard, they contend 
that if the Court found the amended complaint to be deficient, it 
should have dismissed the case without prejudice.  Of course, 
this argument now is partially moot as we are reversing the 
District Court‟s order with respect to appellants‟ AKS claim.  
But we nevertheless address the contention because the 
argument remains germane with respect to the marketing claims. 
 On the merits, we are satisfied that appellants do not provide a 
convincing argument that the District Court, to the extent that 
we hold that it correctly dismissed the complaint, abused its 
discretion by dismissing it with prejudice instead of without 
prejudice, nor do they explain how if permitted to amend they 
could cure the deficiencies that we have identified in their 
complaint.  In making this point we observe that when a district 
court allows plaintiffs the opportunity to amend a complaint so 
that they can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it is implicit in the 
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court‟s ruling that if the plaintiffs seek to amend the complaint 
they will do so only in good faith and allege facts that they 
believe they can prove.
21
  Accordingly, appellants‟ failure to 
explain how they could have amended the complaint to cure its 
deficiencies is a critical omission. 
 Appellants also argue that the District Court 
misconstrued their statement in their reply to appellees‟ motion 
to dismiss that “[i]n the event that the Court concludes that the 
Complaint does not meet the standards of Rule 9(b), Relator 
requests that he be provided the opportunity to amend the 
Complaint . . . . ”  Appellants‟ br. at 43.  Appellants argue that 
the amended complaint adequately pleaded the causes of action 
and that “[t]he request was made only if, and subject to, the 
Court concluding, after a review of United‟s [Motion to 
Dismiss] and the Relator‟s [sic] opposition, that deficiencies 
existed.”  Id. at 44.   
Whatever appellants‟ intentions were in asking the 
District Court to permit them to amend their complaint, we 
agree with that Court that the request, without an attached 
amended complaint, was not the proper method for appellants to 
seek to amend their complaint.  See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. 
Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 
                                                 
21
 We are not suggesting that appellants have acted or would act 
in bad faith and have made or would make allegations that they 
did not believe.  In fact, we do not doubt that appellants believe 
that they can prove the allegations they already have made, and, 
if permitted to amend their complaint again, would be able to 
prove their new allegations. 
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2007) (stating “that a failure to submit a draft amended 
complaint is fatal to a request for leave to amend”).  Therefore, 
to the extent that appellants requested leave to amend their 
complaint, the Court did not abuse its discretion by denying their 
deficient request to amend nor did it abuse its discretion by not 
granting them leave to amend sua sponte.  Id.  To the extent, if 
any, that the Court misunderstood appellants‟ request to amend 
their complaint, that circumstance has no bearing on this appeal. 
 Should appellants on the remand submit another request to 
amend their complaint in any respect, it will be up to the District 
Court to decide whether to grant them leave to amend their 
complaint, and in making that determination to consider the 
procedural appropriateness and substantive merits of the request. 
 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).   
V.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the portion of 
the District Court‟s May 13, 2010 order which dismissed 
appellants‟ FCA allegations based on appellees‟ violation of 
Medicare marketing regulations and will reverse the order 
insofar as it grants appellees‟ motion to dismiss appellants‟ 
amended complaint based on its allegations that appellees 
submitted false claims to the Government by violating the AKS. 
 We will remand the case to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  On remand, the 
District Court should rule on appellees‟ Rule 9(b) contention 
raised in their motion to dismiss with respect to the portion of 
appellants‟ reinstated amended complaint.  The parties shall bear 
their own costs on this appeal. 
